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Abstract
A blockchain is a distributed ledger for recording transactions, maintained by many nodes without
central authority through a distributed cryptographic protocol. All nodes validate the information to
be appended to the blockchain, and a consensus protocol ensures that the nodes agree on a unique
order in which entries are appended. Consensus protocols for tolerating Byzantine faults have re-
ceived renewed attention because they also address blockchain systems. This work discusses the
process of assessing and gaining confidence in the resilience of a consensus protocols exposed to
faults and adversarial nodes. We advocate to follow the established practice in cryptography and
computer security, relying on public reviews, detailed models, and formal proofs; the designers of
several practical systems appear to be unaware of this. Moreover, we review the consensus proto-
cols in some prominent permissioned blockchain platforms with respect to their fault models and
resilience against attacks. The protocol comparison covers Hyperledger Fabric, Tendermint, Sym-
biont, R3 Corda, Iroha, Kadena, Chain, Quorum, MultiChain, Sawtooth Lake, Ripple, Stellar, and
IOTA.
1 Introduction
Blockchains or distributed ledgers are systems that provide a trustworthy service to a group of nodes or
parties that do not fully trust each other. They stand in the tradition of distributed protocols for secure
multiparty computation in cryptography and replicated services tolerating Byzantine faults in distributed
systems. Blockchains also contain many elements from cryptocurrencies, although a blockchain system
can be conceived without a currency or value tokens. Generally, the blockchain acts as a trusted and
dependable third party, for maintaining shared state, mediating exchanges, and providing a secure com-
puting engine. Many blockchains can execute arbitrary tasks, typically called smart contracts, written in
a domain-specific or a general-purpose programming language.
In a permissionless blockchain, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, anyone can be a user or run a node,
anyone can “write” to the shared state through invoking transactions (provided transaction fees are paid
for), and anyone can participate in the consensus process for determining the “valid” state. A permis-
sioned blockchain in contrast, is operated by known entities, such as in consortium blockchains, where
members of a consortium or stakeholders in a given business context operate a permissioned blockchain
network. Permissioned blockchains systems have means to identify the nodes that can control and update
the shared state, and often also have ways to control who can issue transactions. A private blockchain is
a special permissioned blockchain operated by one entity, i.e., within one single trust domain.
Permissioned blockchains address many of the problems that have been studied in the field of dis-
tributed computing over decades, most prominently for developing Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) sys-
tems. Such blockchains can benefit from many techniques developed for reaching consensus, replicating
state, broadcasting transactions and more, in environments where network connectivity is uncertain,
nodes may crash or become subverted by an adversary, and interactions among nodes are inherently
asynchronous. The wide-spread interest in blockchain technologies has triggered new research on prac-
tical distributed consensus protocols. There is also a growing number of startups, programmers, and
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industry groups developing blockchain protocols based on their own ideas, not relying on established
knowledge.
The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of consensus protocols actually being used in the
context of permissioned blockchains, to review the underlying principles, and to compare the resilience
and trustworthiness of some protocols. We leave out permissionless (or “public”) blockchains that are
coupled to a cryptocurrency and their consensus protocols, such as proof-of-work or proof-of-stake, al-
though this is a very interesting subject by itself.
We start by pointing out that developing consensus protocols is difficult and should not be undertaken
in an ad-hoc manner (Sec. 2). A resilient consensus protocol is only useful when it continues to deliver
the intended service under a wide range of adversarial influence on the nodes and the network. Detailed
analysis and formal argumentation are necessary to gain confidence that a protocol achieves its goal.
In that sense, distributed computing protocols resemble cryptosystems and other security mechanisms;
they require broad agreement on the underlying assumptions, detailed security models, formal reasoning,
and wide-spread public discussion. Any claim for a “superior” consensus protocol that does not come
with the necessary formal justification should be dismissed, analogously to the approach of “security by
obscurity,” which is universally rejected by experts.
The text continues in Section 3 with a brief review of consensus in the context of blockchains. As
an example for the principle of scientific study, some serious flaws in a BFT consensus protocol called
Tangaroa (also known as BFT-Raft) are shown. This protocol has gained quite some popularity among
proponents of permissioned blockchains but it is not implemented in any blockchain platform.
In Section 4 the consensus protocols in a number of permissioned blockchain platforms are com-
pared, based on the available product descriptions or source code. Section 5 discusses the consensus
mechanisms of blockchain platforms not directly following the BFT approach: Sawtooth Lake, Ripple
and Stellar, and the IOTA Tangle. A summary concludes the paper.
2 Trust in a blockchain protocol
A blockchain or a distributed ledger protocol can be summarized as a secure distributed protocol that
achieves certain task satisfying targeted consistency (typically atomicity or total order) and liveness (or
availability) semantics. However, verifying and establishing trust in the security, consistency and live-
ness semantics of a blockchain protocol is challenging. This section argues that developing consensus
protocols is similar to building cryptographic systems and that it should benefit from the experience and
practice in cryptography.
It is generally difficult to evaluate any security mechanism. First and foremost, a “secure” solution
should not interfere “too much” with the functionality, i.e., primary task one tries to accomplish. But
more importantly, the security tool should ensure that one can accomplish this task in a way that is
resilient to problems caused by the (adversarial) environment, by preventing, deterring, withstanding, or
tolerating any influence that could hinder one from accomplishing the task.
Showing that the solution works in the absence of problems and attacks is easy. The task is achieved,
and output is straightforward to verify. Assessing the security is the hard part. A security solution should
come with a clearly stated security model and trust assumption, under which the solution should satisfy
its goal. This is widely accepted today; it prompts the question of how to validate that the solution
satisfies its goal.
Yet, the experimental validation of a security solution in the information technology space fails very
often because no experiment can exhaustively test the solution in all scenarios permitted by the model.
In a way, experimentation can only demonstrate the failure of a security mechanism.
Therefore one needs to apply mathematical reasoning and formal tools to reason why the solution
would remain secure under any scenario permitted by the stated trust assumption. Without such reason-
ing, security claims remain vague.
In the domain of blockchain protocols, one can learn a lot from the history of cryptography. Already
since the 19th century, Kerckhoffs’ principle has been widely accepted, which states that “a cryptosystem
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should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.” It implies
that any security claim of the kind that a system embodies a superior but otherwise undisclosed design
should be dismissed immediately.
Starting from the pioneering work in the 1980s, modern cryptography has developed formal treat-
ment, security notions, and corresponding provably secure protocols. Cryptography research has con-
centrated on mathematically formalizing (a small number of) security assumptions, such as “computing
discrete logarithms in particular groups is hard,” and on building complex systems and protocols that
rely on these assumptions, without introducing any additional insecurity. In other words, in a “provably
secure” solution, an attack on the stated goal of the solution can be turned efficiently into a violation of
some underlying assumption.
For assessing whether the formal models are appropriate and whether the security assumptions cover
the situation encountered during deployment, human judgment is needed, best exerted through careful
review, study, validation, and expert agreement. The AES block cipher, for instance, was selected in
2000 by the U.S. NIST after a multi-year public review process during which many candidates were
debated and assessed openly by the world-wide cryptographic research community.
During the internet boom in the late 1990s there were many claims of new and “unbreakable” cryp-
tosystems, all lacking substantiation. Many of them were covered by Schneier in blog posts about “snake
oil,” alluding to the history of medicine before regulation [64]:
The problem with bad security is that it looks just like good security. You can’t tell the
difference by looking at the finished product. Both make the same security claims; both
have the same functionality. (. . . ) Both might use the same protocols, implement the same
standards, and have been endorsed by the same industry groups. Yet one is secure and the
other is insecure.
Expert judgment, formal reasoning, experience, public discussion, and open validation are needed for
accepting a cryptosystem as secure.
A similar development has taken place with building resilient distributed systems, whose goal is
to deliver a service while facing network outages, communication failures, timing uncertainty, power
loss and more. The Chubby database of Google [24] and Yahoo!’s ZooKeeper [38], developed for syn-
chronizing critical configuration information across data centers, support strong consistency and high
availability through redundancy and tolerate benign failures and network outages. Those systems started
from well-understood, mathematically specified, and formally verified protocols in the research litera-
ture (e.g., Lamport’s Paxos protocol [42]). Yet it has taken considerable effort during development and
testing and frequent exercising of failure scenarios during deployment [10] to achieve the desired level
of resilience in practice.
Over the recent years countless proposals for new features in distributed ledger systems and com-
pletely new blockchain protocols have appeared, mainly originating from the nascent fintech industry
and startup scene. Most of them come without formal expression of their trust assumption and security
model. There is no agreed consensus in the industry on which assumptions are realistic for the intended
applications, not to mention any kind of accepted standard or validation for protocols. The field of block-
chain protocols is in its infancy today, but already appears at the peak of overstated expectations [32].
Many fantastic and bold claims are made in the fintech and blockchain space by startups, established
companies, researchers, and self-proclaimed experts alike. This creates excitement but also confusion in
the public opinion.
Broad agreement on trust assumptions, security models, formal reasoning methods, and protocol
goals is needed. Developers, investors, and users in the industry should look towards the established
scientific methodology in cryptography and security with building trustworthy systems, before they en-
trust financial value to new protocols. Open discussion, expert reviews, broad validation, and standards
recommendations should take over and replace the hype.
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3 Consensus
This section presents background and models for consensus in permissioned blockchains, first intro-
ducing the underlying concept of state-machine replication in Section 3.1. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 briefly
review the most prominent family of protocols for this task, which is based Paxos/Viewstamped Replica-
tion (VSR) and PBFT. The essential step of transaction validation is discussed in Section 3.4. To round
off this part, we demonstrate the pitfalls of consensus-protocol design in Section 3.5, by analyzing a
proposed BFT consensus protocol called Tangaroa and showing that it does not achieve its goals.
3.1 Blockchains and consensus
A blockchain is a distributed database holding a continuously growing list of records, controlled by mul-
tiple entities that may not trust each other. Records are appended to the blockchain in batches or blocks
through a distributed protocol executed by the nodes powering the blockchain. Each block contains a
cryptographic hash of the previous block, which fixes all existing blocks and embeds a secure repre-
sentation of the complete chain history into every block. Additional integrity measures are often used
in potentially malicious, Byzantine environments, such as the requirement that a block hash is smaller
than a given target (e.g., in Nakamoto-style proof-of-work consensus), or a multi-signature (or a thresh-
old signature) over a block, by the nodes powering the blockchain (for permissioned blockchains). The
nodes communicate over a network and collaboratively construct of the blockchain without relying on a
central authority.
However, individual nodes might crash, behave maliciously, act against the common goal, or the net-
work communication may become interrupted. For delivering a continuous service, the nodes therefore
run a fault-tolerant consensus protocol to ensure that they all agree on the order in which entries are
appended to the blockchain.
Since the whole blockchain acts as a trusted system, it should be dependable, resilient, and secure,
ensuring properties such as availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality, integrity and more [6]. A
blockchain protocol ensures this by replicating the data and the operations over many nodes. Replication
can have many roles [63, 25, 41], but blockchains replicate data only for resilience, not for scalability.
All nodes validate, in principle, the information to be appended to the blockchain; this feature stimulates
the trust of all nodes in that the blockchain as a whole operates correctly.
For assessing a blockchain protocol, it is important to be clear about the underlying trust assumption
or security model. This specifies the environment for which the protocol is designed and in which it
satisfies its guarantees. Such assumptions should cover all elements in the system, including the network,
the availability of synchronized clocks, and the expected (mis-)behavior of the nodes. For instance,
the typical generic trust assumption for a system with n independent nodes says that no more than
f < n/k nodes become faulty (crash, leak information, perform arbitrary actions, and so on), for some
k = 2, 3, . . . . The other n− f nodes are correct. A trust assumption always represents an idealization of
the real world; if some aspect not considered by the model can affect the actually deployed system, then
the security must be reconsidered.
State-machine replication. The formal study and development of algorithms for exploiting replica-
tion to build resilient servers and distributed systems goes back to Lamport et al.’s pioneering work
introducing Byzantine agreement [57, 44]. The topic has evolved through a long history since and is
covered in many textbooks [4, 18, 59, 73]; a good summary can be found in a “30-year perspective on
replication” [25].
As summarized concisely by Schneider [63], the task of reaching and maintaining consensus among
distributed nodes can be described with two elements: (1) a (deterministic) state machine that implements
the logic of the service to be replicated; and (2) a consensus protocol to disseminate requests among the
nodes, such that each node executes the same sequence of requests on its instance of the service. In the
literature, “consensus” means traditionally only the task of reaching agreement on one single request
(i.e., the first one), whereas “atomic broadcast” [36] provides agreement on a sequence of requests, as
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needed for state-machine replication. But since there is a close connection between the two (a sequence
of consensus instances provides atomic broadcast), the term “consensus” more often actually stands for
atomic broadcast, especially in the context of blockchains. We adopt this terminology here and also use
“transaction” and “request” as synonyms for one of the messages to be delivered in atomic broadcast.
Asynchronous and eventually synchronous models. Throughout this text, we assume the eventual-
synchrony network model, introduced by Dwork et al. [30]. It models an asynchronous network that
may delay messages among correct nodes arbitrarily, but eventually behaves synchronously and deliv-
ers all messages within a fixed (but unknown) time bound. Protocols in this model never violate their
consistency properties (safety) during asynchronous periods, as long as the assumptions on the kind and
number of faulty nodes are met. When the network stabilizes and behaves synchronously, then the nodes
are guaranteed to terminate the protocol (liveness). Note that a protocol may stall during asynchronous
periods; this cannot be avoided due to a fundamental discovery by Fischer et al. [31] (the celebrated
“FLP impossibility result”), which rules out that deterministic protocols reach consensus in (fully) asyn-
chronous networks.
The model is widely accepted today as realistic for designing resilient distributed systems. Replica-
tion protocols have to cope with network interruptions, node failures, system crashes, planned downtime,
malicious attacks by participating nodes, and many more unpredictable effects. Developing protocols for
asynchronous networks therefore provides the best possible resilience and avoids any assumptions about
synchronized clocks and timely network behavior; making such assumptions can quickly turn into a
vulnerability of the system if any one is not satisfied during deployment.
Protocol designers today prefer the eventual synchrony assumption for its simplicity and practitioners
observe that it has broader coverage of actual network behavior, especially when compared to so-called
partially synchronous models that assume probabilistic network behavior over time.
Consensus in blockchain. Although Nakamoto’s Bitcoin paper [54] does not explicitly mention the
state-machine replication paradigm [63], Bitcoin establishes consensus on one shared ledger based on
voting among the nodes: “(Nodes) vote with their CPU power, expressing their acceptance of valid
blocks by working on extending them and rejecting invalid blocks by refusing to work on them. Any
needed rules and incentives can be enforced with this consensus mechanism” [54].
With the work of Garay et al. [33], a formal equivalence between the task solved by the “Nakamoto
protocol” inside Bitcoin and the consensus problem in distributed computing was shown for the first time.
This result coincided with the insight, developed in the fintech industry, that a blockchain platform may
use a generic consensus mechanism and implement it with any protocol matching its trust model [70]. In
today’s understanding a blockchain platform may use an arbitrary consensus mechanism and retain most
of its further aspects like distribution, cryptographic immutability, and transparency.
Existing consensus and replication mechanisms have therefore received renewed attention, for ap-
plying them to blockchain systems. Several protocols relevant for blockchains are reviewed in the
next sections. We discuss only protocols for static groups here; they require explicit group reconfigura-
tion [67, 9] and do not change membership otherwise. This assumption contrasts with view-synchronous
replication [26], where the group composition may change implicitly by removing nodes perceived as
unavailable.
3.2 Crash-tolerant consensus
As mentioned earlier, the form of consensus relevant for blockchain is technically known as atomic
broadcast. It is formally obtained as an extension of a reliable broadcast among the node, which also
provides a global or total order on the messages delivered to all correct nodes. An atomic broadcast is
characterized by two (asynchronous) events broadcast and deliver that may occur multiple times. Every
node may broadcast some message (or transaction) m by invoking broadcast(m), and the broadcast
protocol outputs m to the local application on the node through a deliver(m) event.
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Atomic broadcast ensures that each correct node outputs or delivers the same sequence of messages
through the deliver events. More precisely [36, 18], it ensures these properties:
Validity: If a correct node p broadcasts a message m, then p eventually deliversm.
Agreement: If a messagem is delivered by some correct node, thenm is eventually delivered by every
correct node.
Integrity: No correct node delivers the same message more than once; moreover, if a correct node
delivers a message m and the sender p ofm is correct, thenm was previously broadcast by p.
Total order: For messages m1 and m2, suppose p and q are two correct nodes that deliver m1 and m2.
Then p delivers m1 before m2 if and only if q delivers m1 before m2.
The most important and most prominent way to implement atomic broadcast (i.e., consensus) in
distributed systems prone to t < n/2 node crashes is the family of protocols known today as Paxos [42,
43] and Viewstamped Replication (VSR) [55, 48]. Discovered independently, their core mechanisms
exploit the same ideas [45, 47]. They have been implemented in dozens of mission-critical systems and
power the core infrastructure of major cloud providers today [24].
The Zab protocol inside ZooKeeper is a prominent member of the protocol family; originally from
Yahoo!, it is available as open source [38, 39, 71] (https://zookeeper.apache.org/) and used
by many systems. A more recent addition to the family is Raft [56], a specialized variant developed with
the aim of simplifying the understanding and the implementation of Paxos. It is contained in dozens of
open-source tools (e.g., etcd – https://github.com/coreos/etcd).
All protocols in this family progress in a sequence of views or “epochs,” with a unique leader for each
view that is responsible for progress. If the leader fails, or more precisely, if the other nodes suspect that
the leader has failed, they can replace the current leader by moving to the next view with a fresh leader.
This view change protocol must ensure agreement, such that message already delivered by a node in the
abandoned view is retained and delivered by all correct nodes in this or another future view.
3.3 Byzantine consensus
More recently, consensus protocols for tolerating Byzantine nodes have been developed, where nodes
may be subverted by an adversary and act maliciously against the common goal of reaching agree-
ment. In the eventual-synchrony model considered here, the most prominent protocol is PBFT (Prac-
tical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance) [22]. It can be understood as an extension of the Paxos/VSR fam-
ily [45, 16, 47] and also uses a progression of views and a unique leader within every view. In a system
with n nodes PBFT tolerates f < n/3 Byzantine nodes, which is optimal. Many research works have
analyzed and improved aspects of it and made it more robust in prototypes [27]. A proposed extension
of the Raft variant of Paxos/VSR called Tangaroa has been analyzed in Section 3.5.
Actual systems that implement PBFT or one of its variants are much harder to find than systems im-
plementing Paxos/VSR. In fact, BFT-SMaRt (https://github.com/bft-smart/library) is
the only known project that was developed before the interest in permissioned blockchains surged around
2015 [70]. Actually, Bessani et al. [9, 8] from the University of Lisbon started work on it around 2010.
There is widespread agreement today that BFT-SMaRt is the most advanced and most widely tested im-
plementation of a BFT consensus protocol available. Experiments have demonstrated that it can reach
a throughput of about 80’000 transactions per second in a LAN [9] and very low latency overhead in a
WAN [68].
Like Paxos/VSR, Byzantine consensus implemented by PBFT and BFT-SMaRt expects an eventually
synchronous network to make progress. Without this assumption, only randomized protocols for Byzan-
tine consensus are possible, such as the practical variations relying on distributed cryptography [20] as
prototyped by SINTRA [21] or, much more recently, HoneyBadger [53].
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3.4 Validation
In an atomic broadcast protocol resilient to crashes, every message is usually considered to be an ac-
ceptable request to the service. For Byzantine consensus, especially in blockchain applications, it makes
sense to ask that only “valid” transactions are output by the broadcast protocol. To formalize this, the
protocol is parameterized with a deterministic, external predicate V (), such that the protocol delivers
only messages satisfying V (). This notion has been introduced as external validity by Cachin et al. [19].
The predicate must be deterministically computable locally by every process. More precisely, V ()
must guarantee that when two correct nodes p and q in an atomic broadcast protocol have both delivered
the same sequence of messages up to some point, then p obtains V (m) = TRUE for any message m if
and only if q also determines that V (m) = TRUE.
This combination of transaction validation and establishing consensus is inherent in permission-
less blockchains based on proof-of-work consensus, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. For permissioned-
blockchain protocols, one could in principle also separate this step from consensus and perform the (de-
terministic) validation of transactions on the ordered “raw” sequence output by atomic broadcast. This
could make the protocol susceptible to denial-of-service attacks from clients broadcasting excessively
many invalid transactions. Hence most consensus protocols reviewed in this text combine ordering with
validation and use a form of external validity based on the current blockchain state.
3.5 Tangaroa (BFT-Raft) is neither live nor safe
Before we address the protocols found in practical blockchain platforms, we discuss some flaws in a
proposed BFT consensus protocol that are typical for the kind of mistakes one can make. Tangaroa [28]
is intended as an extension of the Raft [56] consensus protocol for BFT, developed as a class project in
a university course on distributed systems. Although it was neither peer-reviewed nor published in the
scientific literature, and for reasons unknown to us, Tangaroa has become quite prominent as a potential
BFT consensus protocol for permissioned blockchains. Like the other consensus protocols discussed
earlier, Tangaroa uses the eventual-synchrony network model mentioned above, introduced by Dwork
et al. [30]. It must never violate agreement (safety), no matter how the network behaves, and a correct
leader must ensure liveness during synchronous periods, i.e., that messages are continuously delivered.
Raft itself represents a simplified member of the Paxos/VSR family of crash-tolerant replication and
consensus protocols; it was developed for pedagogical reasons [56]. Like Paxos/VSR Raft proceeds in
successive views and defines the role of a leader node for each view. This node is responsible for driving
the protocol. When the protocol within one view stalls, every node by itself will try to become leader
after waiting for a random time. A leader election phase follows, from which one node will emerge as
leader and be accepted by all other (follower) nodes. Once established, the leader orders and replicates
messages within its view.
For extending the structure behind Raft to tolerate f < n/3 Byzantine nodes, one has to solve at least
the leader-election problem and the reliable message replication within a view. Although it is well-known
how to achieve this, as demonstrated by PBFT [22], many related protocols [5], as well as pedagogical
descriptions of PBFT [47, 18], Tangaroa fails in at least two ways to withstand maliciously acting nodes:
Liveness issue. If the network is synchronous (i.e., well-connected, messages are delivered timely, and
nodes are synchronized), then the protocol should be live and continuously order messages. How-
ever, since any node may propose itself to become leader, a malicious node might simply rush in
at the start of a view, become elected as leader, and then refuse to perform any further work. There
is no way for the nodes to verify that the node waited for its timeout to expire. Hence, the protocol
violates liveness.
Safety issue. The leader of a view should ensure that all correct nodes deliver the same messages in the
same order. This is complicated because the leader might fail or even actively try to make the
nodes disagree on the delivered message. After a view change, the next leader must be able to
resume from a consistent state and be sure it does not deliver a message twice or omit one.
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However, Tangaroa directly uses the low-level messaging structure from Raft, even though it is
well-known that additional rounds of exchanges are necessary to cope with the problems that a
Byzantine leader might create. This can lead to a violation of agreement by Tangaroa, in the sense
that two correct nodes decide differently; in a blockchain, their ledgers would fork and this is a
deathblow for a permissioned blockchain.
We illustrate the reason for the safety problem with Tangaroa in Remark 1. Readers not interested in
pitfalls of distributed consensus protocols should skip to the next subsection.
Remark 1 (Safety violation by Tangaroa). Within a view, the leader broadcasts an “AppendEntries”
message containing the payload to be replicated to all nodes. (To “broadcast” means here only that if
the leader is correct, it sends the same point-to-point message to all nodes.) A node that receives this
(for the first time at a given index) echoes it by broadcasting “AppendEntriesResponse” to all. When a
node receives a Byzantine quorum of those, it commits the payload (“applies the . . . committed entries
to its state machine”). This communication primitive is known in the literature as Byzantine consistent
broadcast (BCB) [18, Sec. 3.10], it goes back to Srikanth and Toueg [69]. BCB ensures consistency in the
sense that if some two correct nodes deliver any payload, then they deliver the same payload. BCB does
not ensure that any node delivers any payload when the leader is faulty. BCB neither ensures agreement
in the sense that once some correct node has delivered a payload, any other correct node will also deliver
that.
It is now possible that in a network with nodes A,B,C,D the current leaderD is faulty and causes A
to deliver and commit some payloadm [18, Fig. 3.11]. B may have echoedm but did not deliver it. Then
D causes a leader change to C; from this moment on, no more messages reach A due to asynchronous
network behavior and D behaves as if m was never broadcast. C has no knowledge of m and instead
picks another payloadm′ and delivers that. Then A and C deliver different payloadsm 6= m′ and violate
the total-order and agreement properties of consensus (Sec. 3.2 and 3.3).
It is well-known how to prevent this: PBFT [22] uses Byzantine reliable broadcast (BRB) in the
place of the BCB in Tangaroa (BRB was first formulated by Bracha [11]). This primitive entails a
second all-to-all message exchange, formally ensures the agreement property, and, most importantly,
makes it possible for a subsequent leader to gather enough information so as not to violate the consensus
protocol’s guarantees.
3.6 Protocols summary
As an outlook to the following two sections, Table 1 presents a summary of the protocols discussed in
the remainder of this work.
4 Permissioned blockchains
This section discusses some notable consensus protocols that are part of (or have at least been proposed
for) the following consortium blockchain systems: Hyperledger Fabric; Tendermint; Symbiont Assem-
bly; R3 Corda; Iroha; Kadena; Chain; Quorum; and MultiChain. We assume there are n distributed
nodes responsible for consensus, but some systems contain further nodes with other roles. Each of the
subsections contains a table summarizing the consensus resilience properties.
4.1 Overview
Among the recent flurry of blockchain-consensus protocols, many have not progressed past the stage
of a paper-based description. In this section, we review only protocols implemented in a platform; the
platform must either be available as open source or have been described in sufficient detail in marketing
material. So far all implemented protocols discussed here assume independence among the failures, self-
ish behavior, and subversion of nodes. This justifies the choice of a numeric trust assumption, expressed
only by a fraction of potentially faulty nodes.
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Hyperledger Fabric/Kafka . X . −
Hyperledger Fabric/PBFT . X . X
Tendermint . X . X
Symbiont/BFT-SMaRt . X . X
R3 Corda/Raft . X . −
R3 Corda/BFT-SMaRt . X . X
Iroha/Sumeragi (BChain) . X . X
Kadena/ScalableBFT ? ? ? ?
Chain/Federated Consensus − (X) − −
Quorum/QuorumChain − (X) − −
Quorum/Raft . X . −
MultiChain + . X . −
Sawtooth Lake/PoET ⊕ X ⊕ −
Ripple ⊗ (X) ⊗ −
Stellar/SCP ? ? ? ?
IOTA Tangle ? ? ? ?
Table 1: Summary of consensus resilience properties, some of which use statically configured nodes
with a special role. Symbols and notes: ‘X’ means that the protocol is resilient against the fault and ‘−’
that it is not; ‘.’ states that no such special node exists in the protocol; ‘?’ denotes that the properties
cannot be assessed due to lack of information; (X) denotes the crash of other nodes, different from the
special node; + MultiChain has non-final decisions; ⊕ PoET assumes trusted hardware available from
only one vendor; ⊗ Ripple tolerates one of the five default Ripple-operated validators (special nodes) to
be subverted.
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It would be readily possible to extend such protocols to more complex fault assumptions, as for-
mulated by generic Byzantine quorum systems [49]. For example, this would allow to run stake-based
consensus (as done in some permissionless blockchains) or to express an arbitrary power structure for-
mulated in a legal agreement for the consortium [15]. No platform offers this yet, however.
4.2 Hyperledger Fabric – Apache Kafka and PBFT
Hyperledger Fabric (https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric) is a platform for distributed
ledger solutions, written in Golang and with a modular architecture that allows multiple implementations
for its components. It is one of multiple blockchain frameworks hosted with the Hyperledger Project
(https://www.hyperledger.org/) and aims at high degrees of confidentiality, resilience, flexi-
bility, and scalability.
Following “preview” releases (v0.5 and v0.6) in 2016, whose architecture [17] directly conforms
to state-machine replication, a different and more elaborate design was adopted later and is currently
available in release v1.0.0-beta. The new architecture [2], termed Fabric V1 here, separates the execution
of smart-contract transactions (in the sense of validating the inputs and outputs of a program) from
ordering transactions for avoiding conflicts (in the sense of an atomic broadcast that ensures consistency).
This has several advantages, including better scalability, a separation of trust assumptions for transaction
validation and ordering, support for non-deterministic smart contracts, partitioning of smart-contract
code and data across nodes, and using modular consensus implementations [74].
The consensus protocol up to release v0.6-preview was a native implementation of PBFT [22].
With V1 the ordering service responsible for conflict-avoidance can be provided by an Apache Kafka
cluster (https://kafka.apache.org/). Kafka is a distributed streaming platform with a pub-
lish/subscribe interface, aimed at high throughput and low latency. It logically consists of broker nodes
and consistency nodes, where a set of redundant brokers processes each message stream and a ZooKeeper
instance (https://zookeeper.apache.org/) running on the consistency nodes coordinates the
brokers in case of crashes or network problems. Fabric therefore inherits is basic resilience against
crashes from ZooKeeper. A second implementation of the ordering service is under development, which
uses again the PBFT protocol and achieves resilience against subverted nodes. Besides, BFT-SMaRt
(Sec. 3.3) is currently being integrated in Fabric V1 as one of the ordering services. Since BFT-SMaRt
follows the well-established literature on Byzantine consensus protocols as mentioned earlier, its prop-
erties do not need special discussion here.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/2 −
Liveness n t < n/2 −
Table 2: Resilience of Hyperledger Fabric V1 with the Kafka-based orderer. It supports an arbitrary
number of “peer” nodes, but “node” refers to those nodes comprising the ordering service. “Subverted”
means an adversarial, Byzantine node.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/3 f < n/3
Liveness n t < n/3 f < n/3
Table 3: Resilience of Hyperledger Fabric v0.6, where “node” refers to any node. The same resilience
holds for Fabric V1 with the future PBFT-based orderer, where “node” refers to those nodes comprising
the ordering service.
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4.3 Tendermint
Tendermint Core (https://github.com/tendermint/tendermint) is a BFT protocol that
can be best described as a variant of PBFT [22], as its common-case messaging pattern is a variant of
Bracha’s Byzantine reliable broadcast [11]. In contrast to PBFT, where the client sends a new transaction
directly to all nodes, the clients in Tendermint disseminate their transactions to the validating nodes (or,
simply, validators) using a gossip protocol. The external validity condition, evaluated within the Bracha-
broadcast pattern, requires that a validator receives the transactions by gossip before it can vote for
inclusion of the transaction in a block, much like in PBFT.
Tendermint’s most significant departure from PBFT is the continuous rotation of the leader. Namely,
the leader is changed after every block, a technique first used in BFT consensus space by the Spinning
protocol [62]. Much like Spinning, Tendermint embeds aspects of PBFT’s view-change mechanism into
the common-case pattern. This is reflected in the following: while a validator expects the first message in
the Bracha broadcast pattern from the leader, it also waits for a timeout, which resembles the view-change
timer in PBFT. However, if the timer expires, a validator continues participating in the Bracha-broadcast
message pattern, but votes for a nil block.
Tendermint as originally described by Buchman [13] suffers from a livelock bug, pertaining to lock-
ing and unlocking votes by validators in the protocol. However, the protocol contains additional mecha-
nisms not described in the cited report that prevent the livelock from occurring [14]. While it appears to
be sound, the Tendermint protocol and its implementation are still subject to a thorough, peer-reviewed
correctness analysis.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/3 f < n/3
Liveness n t < n/3 f < n/3
Table 4: Resilience of Tendermint.
4.4 Symbiont – BFT-SMaRt
Symbiont Assembly (https://symbiont.io/technology/assembly) is a proprietary distributed
ledger platform. The company that stands behind it, Symbiont, focuses on applications of distributed
ledgers in the financial industry, providing automation for modeling and executing complex instruments
among institutional market participants.
Assembly implements resilient consensus in its platform based on the open-source BFT-SMaRt
toolkit (Sec. 3.3). Symbiont uses its own reimplementation of BFT-SMaRt in a different programming
language; it reports performance numbers of 80’000 transactions per second (tps) using a 4-node cluster
on a LAN. This matches the throughput expected from BFT-SMaRt [9] and similar results in the research
literature on BFT protocols [5].
Assembly uses the standard resilience assumptions for BFT consensus in the eventually-synchronous
model considered here.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/3 f < n/3
Liveness n t < n/3 f < n/3
Table 5: Resilience of BFT-SMaRt (reimplemented inside Symbiont Assembly).
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4.5 R3 Corda – Raft and BFT-SMaRt
Unlike most of the other permissioned blockchain platforms discussed here, Corda (https://github.
com/corda/corda) does not order all transactions as one single virtual execution that forms the
blockchain. Instead, it defines states and transactions, where every transaction consumes (multiple)
states and produces a new state [37]. Only nodes affected by a transaction store it. Seen across all users,
this transaction execution model produces a hashed directed acyclic graph or Hash-DAG. Transactions
must be valid, i.e., endorsed by the issuer and other affected nodes and correct according to the under-
lying smart-contract logic governing the state. Each state points to a notary responsible for ensuring
transaction uniqueness, i.e., that each state is consumed only once. The notary is a logical service that
can be provided jointly by multiple nodes. The type of a state may designate an asset represented by the
network, such as a token or an obligation, or anything else controlled by a smart contract.
A transaction in Corda consumes only states controlled by the same notary; hence, one notary by
itself can atomically verify the transaction’s validity and uniqueness to decide whether it is executed or
not. To enable transactions that operate across states governed by different notaries, there is a specialized
transaction that changes the notary, such that one notary will become responsible for validating the
transaction.
Since a node stores only a part of the Hash-DAG, it only knows about transactions and states that
concern the node. This contrasts with most other distributed ledgers and provides means for partitioning
the data among the nodes. As is the case for other smart-contract platforms, transactions refer to contracts
that can be programmed in a universal general-purpose language.
A notary service in Corda orders and timestamps transactions that include states pointing to it. “No-
taries are expected to be composed of multiple mutually distrusting parties who use a standard consensus
algorithm” (https://docs.corda.net). A notary service needs to cryptographically sign its state-
ments of transaction uniqueness, such that other nodes in the network can rely on its assertions without
directly talking to the notary. Currently there is support for running a notary service as a single node
(centralized), for running a distributed crash-tolerant implementation using Raft (Sec. 3.2), and for dis-
tributing it using the open-source BFT-SMaRt toolkit (Sec. 3.3). When using Raft deployed on n nodes,
a Corda notary tolerates crashes of any t < n/2 of these nodes (Sec. 3.2). With BFT-SMaRt running on
n nodes, the notary is resilient to the subversion of f < n/3 nodes.
Notary Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/2 −
Liveness n t < n/2 −
Table 6: Resilience of a Raft-based notary service in Corda. A Corda network may contain multiple
notary services and many more nodes.
Notary Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/3 f < n/3
Liveness n t < n/3 f < n/3
Table 7: Resilience of a BFT-SMaRt-based notary service in Corda. A Corda network may contain
multiple notary services and many more nodes.
4.6 Iroha – Sumeragi
Iroha (https://github.com/hyperledger/iroha) is another open-source blockchain plat-
form developed under the Hyperledger Project. Its architecture is inspired by the original (v0.6) design
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of Fabric (Sec. 4.2). All validating nodes collaboratively execute a Byzantine consensus protocol. In that
sense it is also similar to Tendermint and Symbiont Assembly.
The Sumeragi consensus library of Iroha is “heavily inspired” by BChain [29] a chain-style Byzan-
tine replication protocol that propagates transactions among the nodes with a “chain” topology. Chain
replication [72, 25] arranges the n nodes linearly and each node normally only receives messages from
its predecessor and sends messages to its successor. Although there is a leader at the head of the chain,
like in many other protocols, the leader does not become a bottleneck since it usually communicates only
with the head and the tail of the chain, but not with all n nodes. This balances the load among the nodes
and lets chain-replication protocols achieve the best possible throughput [35, 5], at the cost of higher
normal-case latency and slightly increased time for reconfiguration after faults.
In Sumeragi, the order of the nodes is determined based on a reputation system, which takes the
“age” of a node and its past performance into account.
As becomes apparent from the online documentation (https://github.com/hyperledger/
iroha/wiki/Sumeragi), though, the protocol departs from the “chain” pattern, because the leader
“broadcasts” to all nodes and so does the node at the tail. Hence, it is neither BChain nor chain repli-
cation. Assuming that Sumeragi would correctly implement BChain, then it relies on the standard as-
sumptions for BFT consensus in the eventually-synchronous model, just like Fabric v0.6, Tendermint,
and Symbiont.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/3 f < n/3
Liveness n t < n/3 f < n/3
Table 8: Resilience of Iroha, assuming the Sumeragi consensus implementation is BChain [29].
4.7 Kadena – Juno and ScalableBFT
Juno from kadena (https://github.com/kadena-io/juno) is a platform for running smart
contracts that has been developed until about November 2016 according to its website. Juno claims to
use a “Byzantine Fault Tolerant Raft” protocol for consensus and appears to address the standard BFT
model with n nodes, f < n/3 Byzantine faults among them, and eventual synchrony [30] as timing
assumption. Later Juno has been deprecated in favor of a “proprietary BFT-consensus protocol” called
ScalableBFT [51], which is “inspired by the Tangaroa protocol” and optimizes performance compared to
Juno and Tangaroa. The whitepaper cites over 7000 transactions per second (tps) throughput on a cluster
with size 256 nodes.
The design and implementation of ScalableBFT are proprietary and not available for public review.
Being based on Tangaroa, the design might suffer from its devastating problems mentioned in Section 3.3.
Further statements about ScalableBFT made in a blog post [61] do not enhance the trust in its safety:
“Every transaction is replicated to every node. When a majority of nodes have replicated the transaction,
the transaction is committed.” As is well-known from the literature [25, 18] in the model considered
here, with public-key cryptography for message authentication and asynchrony, agreement in a consensus
protocol can only be ensured with n > 3f and Byzantine quorums [49] of size strictly larger than n+f
2
,
which reduces to 2f +1 with n = 3f +1 nodes. Hence “replicating among a majority” does not suffice.
The claimed performance number of more than 7000 tps is in line with the throughput of 30’000–
80’000 tps, as reported by a representative state-of-the-art BFT protocol evaluation in the literature [5].
However, since Juno is proprietary, it is not not clear how it actually works nor why one should trust it,
as discussed before. One should rather build on established consensus approaches and publicly validated
algorithms than on a proprietary protocol for resilience.
As the resilience of Juno and ScalableBFT cannot be assessed, and as it remains unclear whether it
actually provides consensus as intended, there is no summary table.
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4.8 Chain – Federated Consensus
The Chain Core platform (https://chain.com) is a generic infrastructure for an institutional con-
sortium to issue and transfer financial assets on permissioned blockchain networks. It focuses on the
financial services industry and supports multiple different assets within the same network.
The Federated Consensus [23] protocol of Chain Core is executed by the n nodes that make up the
network. One of the nodes is statically configured as “block generator.” It periodically takes a number of
new, non-executed transactions, assembles them into blocks, and submits the block for approval to “block
signers.” Every signer validates the block proposed for a given block height, checking the signature of
the generator, validating the transactions, and verifying some real-time constraints and then signs an
endorsement for the block. Each signer endorses only one block at each height. Once a node receives q
such endorsements for a block, the node appends the block to its chain.
The protocol is resilient to a number of malicious (Byzantine-faulty) signers but not to a malicious
block generator. If the block generator violates the protocol (e.g., by signing two different blocks for the
same block height) the ledger might fork (i.e., the consensus protocol violates safety). The documenta-
tion states that such misbehavior should be addressed by retaliation and measures for this remain outside
the protocol.
More specifically, when assuming the block generator operates correctly and is live, this Federated
Consensus reduces to an ordinary Byzantine quorum system that tolerates f faulty signer nodes when
q = 2f + 1 and n = 3f + 1; its use for consensus is similar, say, to the well-understood “authenticated
echo broadcast” [18, Sec. 3.10.3]. Up to f block signers may behave arbitrarily, such as by endorsing
incorrect transactions or by refusing to participate, and the protocol will remain live and available (with
the correct block generator).
Overall, however, Federated Consensus is a special case of a standard BFT-consensus protocol that
appears to operate with a fixed “leader” (in the role of the block generator). The protocol cannot prevent
forks if the generator is malicious. Even if the generator simply crashes, the protocol halts and requires
manual intervention. Standard BFT protocols instead will tolerate leader corruption and automatically
switch to a different leader if it becomes apparent that one leader malfunctions.
Since the block generator must be correct, the purpose of a signature issued by a block signer remains
unclear, at least at the level of the consensus protocol. The only reason appears to be guaranteeing that
the signer cannot later repudiate having observed a block.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes Special Any s special Special nodes
nodes crash subverted nodes nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/3 f < n/3 m = 1 − −
Liveness n t < n/3 f < n/3 m = 1 − −
Table 9: Resilience of Federated Consensus in Chain Core. The single special node is the block generator.
The protocol cannot handle the case that it fails.
4.9 Quorum – QuorumChain and Raft
Quorum (https://github.com/jpmorganchase/quorum),mainly from developers at JPMor-
gan Chase, is an enterprise-focused version of Ethereum, executing smart contracts with the Ethereum
virtual machine, but using an alternative to the default proof-of-work consensus protocol of the public
Ethereum blockchain. The platform currently contains two consensus protocols, called QuorumChain
and Raft-based consensus.
QuorumChain. This protocol uses a smart contract to validate blocks. The trust model specifies a set
of n “voter” nodes and some number of “block-maker” nodes, whose identities are known to all nodes.
The documentation remains unclear about the trust model, not clearly expressing in which ways one
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or more of these nodes might fail or behave adversarially. (One can draw some conclusions from the
protocol though.)
The protocol uses the standard peer-to-peer gossip layer of Ethereum to propagate blocks and votes
on blocks, but the logic itself is formulated as a smart contract deployed with the genesis block. Nodes
digitally sign every message they send. Only block-maker nodes are permitted to propose block to be
appended; nodes with voter role validate blocks and express their approval by a (yes) vote. A block-
maker waits for a randomly chosen time and then creates, signs, and propagates a new block that extends
its own chain. A voter will validate the block (by executing its transactions and checking its consistency),
“vote” on it, and propagate this. A voter apparently votes for every received block that is valid and
extends its own chain, and it may vote multiple times for a given block height. Voting continues for a
period specified in real time. Each node accepts and extends its own chain with the block that obtains
more votes than a given threshold, and if there are multiple ones, the one with most votes. There is one
block-maker node by default.
To assess the resilience of the protocol, it is obvious that already one malicious block-maker node can
easily create inconsistencies (chain forks) unless the network is perfect and already provides consensus.
With one block-maker, if this node crashes, the protocol halts. Depending on how the operator sets the
voting threshold and on the network connectivity, it may fork the chain with only two block-makers and
without any Byzantine fault. With a Byzantine fault in a block-maker node or a voter node can disrupt
the protocol and also create inconsistencies. Furthermore, the protocol relies on synchronized clocks for
safety and liveness. Taken together, the protocol cannot ensure consensus in any realistic sense.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes Special Any s special Special nodes
nodes crash subverted nodes nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/3 f < n/3 m = 1 − −
Liveness n t < n/3 f < n/3 m = 1 − −
Table 10: Resilience of QuorumChain consensus in Quorum. The special nodes are the block-maker
nodes. With m > 1 block-maker nodes, safety is not guaranteed and forks may occur due to network
effects, even when all block-makers are correct.
Raft-based consensus. The second and more recent consensus option available for Quorum is based
on the Raft protocol [56], which is a popular variant of Paxos [42] available in many open-source toolkits.
Quorum uses the implementation in etcd (https://github.com/coreos/etcd) and co-locates
every Quorum-node with an etcd-node (itself running Raft). Raft will replicate the transactions to all
participating nodes and ensure that each node locally outputs the same sequence of transactions, despite
crashes of nodes. The deployment actually tolerates that any t < n/2 of the n etcd-nodes may crash.
Raft relies on timeliness and synchrony only for liveness, not for safety.
This is a canonical design, directly interpreting the replication of Quorum smart contracts as a repli-
cated state machine. It seems appropriate for a protected environment, which is not subject to adversarial
nodes.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety n t < n/2 −
Liveness n t < n/2 −
Table 11: Resilience of Raft-based consensus in Quorum. Every generic node is also an etcd-node.
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4.10 MultiChain
The MultiChain platform (https://github.com/MultiChain/multichain) is intended for
permissioned blockchains in the financial industry and for multi-currency exchanges in a consortium,
aiming at compatibility with the Bitcoin ecosystem as much as possible.
MultiChain uses a dynamic permissioned model [34]: There is a list of permitted nodes in the net-
work at all times, identified by their public keys. The list can be changed through transactions executed
on the blockchain, but at all times, only nodes on this list validate blocks and participate in the protocol.
As theMultiChain platform is derived from Bitcoin, its consensus mechanism is called “mining” [34];
however, in the permissioned model, the nodes do not solve computational puzzles. Instead, any permit-
ted node may generate new blocks after waiting for a random timeout, subject to a diversity parameter
ρ ∈ [0, 1] that constrains the acceptable miners for a given block height. More precisely, if the permitted
list has length L, then a block proposal from a node is only accepted if the blockchain held by the vali-
dating node does not already contain a block generated by the same node among the ⌈ρL⌉ most recent
blocks. Any participating node will extend its blockchain with the first valid block of this kind that it
receives, and if it learns about different, conflicting chain extensions, it will select the longer one (as
in Bitcoin). Furthermore, a well-behaved node will not generate a new block if its own chain already
contains a block of his within the last ⌈ρL⌉ blocks.
It appears that the random timeouts and network uncertainty easily lead to forks in the ledger, even if
all nodes are correct. If two different nodes may generate a valid block at roughly the same time, and any
other node will append the one of which it hears first to its chain, then these two nodes will be forked.
This is not different from consensus in Bitcoin and will eventually converge to a single chain if all nodes
follow the protocol. However, if a single attacking node generates transactions and blocks as it wants,
and assuming that the network behaves favorably for the attack, the node can take over the entire network
and revert arbitrarily many past transactions (in the same way as a “51%-attack” in Bitcoin).
Hence, MultiChain exhibits non-final transactions similar to any proof-of-work consensus. But
whereas lack of finality appears to be a consequence of the public nature of proof-of-work, and since
MultiChain is permissioned, forks and non-final decisions could be avoided here completely. The tra-
ditional consensus protocols for this model, discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, all reach consensus with
finality. In the model of non-final consensus decisions, with the corresponding delays and throughput
constraints, the MultiChain consensus protocol can only remain consistent and live with one single cor-
rect node.
Generic Any t nodes Any f nodes
nodes crash subverted
Safety* n t < n −
Liveness n t < n −
Table 12: Resilience of MultiChain consensus. Safety* denotes the non-final consistency notion, as
achieved by proof-of-work consensus, and should be understood formally as in recent work on the sub-
ject [33].
4.11 Further platforms
Another extension of the Ethereum platform isHydraChain (https://github.com/HydraChain/
hydrachain/blob/develop/README.md), which adds support for creating a permissioned dis-
tributed ledger using the Ethereum infrastructure. The repository describes a proprietary consensus pro-
tocol “initially inspired by Tendermint.” Without clear explanation of the protocol and formal review of
its properties, its correctness remains unclear.
The Swirlds hashgraph algorithm is built into a proprietary “distributed consensus platform” (https:
//www.swirlds.com); a white paper is available [7] and the protocol is also implemented in an
open-source consensus platform for distributed applications, called Babble (https://github.com/
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babbleio/babble). It targets consensus for a permissioned blockchain with n nodes and f < n/3
Byzantine faults among them, i.e., the standard Byzantine consensus problem according to Section 3.3.
In contrast to PBFT and other protocols discussed there, it operates in a “completely asynchronous”
model. The white paper states arguments for the safety and liveness of the protocol and explains that
hashgraph consensus is randomized to circumvent the FLP impossibility [31]. Since the algorithm is
guaranteed to reach agreement on a binary decision (i.e., with only 0/1 outcomes) only with exponen-
tially small probability in n [7, Thm. 5.16], it appears similar to Ben-Or-style randomized agreement [18,
Sec. 5.5]. However, no independent validation or analysis of hashgraph consensus is available.
5 Permissionless blockchains
The most widely used consensus protocols in permissionless blockchains are proof-of-work and proof-
of-stake, which appear always coupled to a cryptocurrency. There is a lot of research and development
activity addressing them at the moment, and covering this would go beyond the scope of this text.
Instead, this section reviews some notable variants of protocols that do not rely on a strict notion of
membership and therefore differ from the permissioned blockchain platforms reviewed in the last section.
The protocols described here depart in other ways from the traditional consensus notions (crash-tolerant,
Byzantine, and proof-of-work-style consensus). Conceptually they fall somewhere between the extremes
of a BFT protocol and Nakamoto’s proof-of-work consensus.
5.1 Sawtooth Lake – Proof of Elapsed Time
TheHyperledger Sawtooth platform (https://github.com/hyperledger/sawtooth-core)
provides means for running general-purpose smart contracts on a distributed ledger. It can use a permis-
sioned and a public, permissionless mode. The platform also introduces a novel consensus protocol
called Proof of Elapsed Time (PoET), originally contributed by Intel, which is based on the insight that
proof-of-work essentially imposes a mandatory but random waiting time for leader election.
In particular, when ignoring the mining reward of Bitcoin, Nakamoto consensus lets all nodes par-
ticipate in a probabilistic experiment, where each node is delayed for a random duration. Once the timer
expires, the node can prove to all others in a verifiable way that it has executed the “waiting step” cor-
rectly for extending the blockchain. The node propagates its solution to all others as quickly as possible,
because only the longest chain is valid. With the correct relation between the tunable waiting-delay and
the expected time for reaching every node with the new solution, this creates a stable consensus protocol.
The Bitcoin network’s operation and mathematical analysis [33] demonstrate this.
PoET consensus executes the waiting step in a trusted hardware module, the Intel Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) available in many modern Intel CPUs. Every node essentially calls an enclave inside
SGX for generating a random delay, waiting accordingly, and then declaring itself to be the leader in
consensus and extending the blockchain. The platform creates an attestation that can be used by any node
to verify that the leader correctly waited for the proper random time. Assuming the hardware module
cannot be subverted, this creates the same kind of non-final consensus as with mining in proof-of-work.
The energy waste caused by mining goes away. However, economic investment still increases the
influence on the protocol because the probability of a node becoming the leader is proportional to the
number of hardware modules under its control. PoET is compatible with permissionless blockchains, but
only assuming an unlimited supply of trusted modules. As the protocol’s security depends on the hard-
ware module potentially running on an adversarial host, the impact of attacks will have to be understood
as well (e.g., SGX is susceptible to rollback attacks [12] and key extraction [66]).
In a permissioned setting, the participating modules could be authenticated and the weight of a node
can be fixed through this. However, with known nodes, traditional BFT consensus protocols have several
advantages compared to PoET: they are more efficient, do not rely on a single vendor’s hardware, and
create final decisions. Moreover, if trusted modules are available, then BFT consensus can increase the
resilience to f < n/2 subverted nodes and achieve more than 70’000 tps throughput in a LAN [40].
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5.2 Ripple and Stellar
Ripple (https://ripple.com/) and Stellar (https://www.stellar.org/) are two globally
operating exchange networks with built-in cryptocurrencies; unlike Bitcoin, they do not involve mining
and operate in a somewhat permissioned fashion. The Ripple protocol consensus algorithm (RPCA)
and its offspring Stellar consensus protocol (SCP) depart from the traditional security assumption for
consensus protocols (i.e., some f < n/3 faulty nodes) by making their trust assumptions flexible [65, 52].
This means that each node would declare on its own which nodes it trusts, instead of accepting a global
assumption on which node collusions the protocol tolerates. Each node designates a list of other nodes
sufficient to convince itself (through the unique node list in Ripple or the quorum slice of Stellar).
Ripple and Stellar each maintain one distributed ledger governed by the protocol, which records
exchanges on the respective network.
Ripple. In Ripple, the process of advancing the common distributed ledger is controlled by so-called
validating nodes. They periodically start to create a new ledger entry (every few seconds) and iteratively
vote in rounds on its content; each node accepts a proposed ledger update if 50%, . . . , 80% (increasing
by +10% per round) of the signed updates that it receives match.
Ripple’s documentation states that 4/5 · n of all n validator nodes must be correct for maintaining
correctness [65]. This would correspond to tolerating f < n/5 subverted nodes in traditional BFT
systems.
Furthermore, it is obvious that a minimal overlap among the convincing-sets (i.e., unique node lists)
of all pairs of validating nodes is required, since otherwise they could exhibit split-brain behavior and the
ledger would fork. Ripple states that the overlap should be at least 1/5 of the size of the larger list [65].
The only peer-reviewed analysis of the Ripple protocol, however, contradicts this. Armknecht et al. [3]
show that when each node has ρn validators in its convincing-set, then ledger forks are ruled out only
if for every two nodes, their lists contain more than 2(1 − ρ)m common nodes, where m is the size of
the larger of the two lists. This implies more than 2/5 overlap with ρ = 0.8 as chosen by the Ripple
network.
Currently, Ripple “provides a default and recommended list of validators operated by Ripple and
third parties,” through a static configuration file; by default there are five validators operated by Ripple
which trust each other and no other node. (“At present, Ripple cannot recommend any validators aside
from the 5 core validators run by Ripple (the company)” [60].) It appears that this list is adopted by most
validating nodes in the system; consequently, trust is by far not as decentralized as advertised.
A typical consensus process creating one new ledger entry completes in less than four seconds on
average. Ripple has stated a throughput of about 1000 tps on a test network [1]. Compared to several
10’000 tps achievable on traditional BFT platforms with a small group of 4–10 validators [68], this seems
unnecessarily slow.
Stellar. As Stellar evolved from Ripple, it uses similar ideas and a protocol called federated Byzantine
agreement [52] within the Stellar consensus protocol (SCP). Only validator nodes participate in the
protocol for reaching consensus. Each validator declares its own convincing-set (called “quorum slice”
and similar to Ripple’s unique node list) that must sufficiently overlap with the convincing-sets of other
nodes for preventing forks. A node accepts a “vote” or a transaction for the ledger when a threshold of
nodes in its convincing-set confirm it. Examples in the documentation and the white paper [52, Fig. 3]
suggest the use of hierarchical structures with different groups organized into multiple levels, where a
different threshold may exist for each group (but the “threshold should be 2/3 for the top level”).
For instance, a convincing-set (i.e., a quorum slice) in a hierarchy with two levels could be like this
(expressed in percent and rounded to integers):
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67% of Groups, where
Groups = {Banks,Auditors,Advisors,Friends} // here: 3 of 4 sub-groups
51% of Banks, where
Banks = {Bank-1,Bank-2,Bank-3} // here: 2 of 3 banks
58% of Auditors, where
Auditors = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G} // here: 5 of 7 auditors
51% of Advisors, where
Advisors = {1, 2, 3} // here: 2 of 3 advisors
1% of Friends, where
Friends = {Alice,Bob,Charlie, . . . ,Zach} // here: 1 of 26 friends
Similar structures have been known as Byzantine quorum systems (BQS) [49] and are well-understood.
They can readily be used to build consensus protocols for BFT systems [15]. The documentation avail-
able for Stellar does not relate to this literature, however.
Furthermore, it seems that for constructing one single ledger, the convincing-sets for all useful con-
figurations of SCP should intersect at the top of the suggested hierarchies. This appears to introduce
some amount of centralization, similar to BQS [50].
At this time, determining the similarities and differences between the quorum slices of SCP and
generic BQS for Byzantine consensus remains an open problem.
5.3 IOTA Tangle
IOTA (http://iota.org/) is heralded as a “cryptocurrency without a blockchain” and creates a
Hash-DAG instead, which is called the tangle [58]. All of its tokens are created at the outset. Transactions
are propagated in a peer-to-peer network like in Bitcoin; each transaction transfers tokens owned by a
node to others and must be signed by the owner’s key node. A transaction also includes the solution
to a proof-of-work puzzle and approves two or any k ≥ 2 transactions by including a hash of them in
the transaction. This creates the DAG, with an edge pointing from each confirmed transaction to the new
one. A weight is assigned to the transaction proportionally to the difficulty of the puzzle that the node has
solved for producing it. The node is supposed to choose the k transactions to confirm randomly, from all
transactions it is aware of, and to verify the two transactions plus all transitive predecessor transactions
of them. Implicitly it should also verify the transaction(s) that have earlier assigned the tokens to the
node.
A node can cheat by (1) issuing an invalid transaction (double-spending), (2) including invalid pre-
decessor transactions, or (3) not selecting the transactions to confirm randomly. However, other nodes
would intuitively not include invalid transactions produced from (1) or (2), and therefore such a transac-
tion would become orphaned. In a dense graph, it is expected that most transactions of a certain age are
approved by a vast majority of all newly generated transactions.
How strongly a new transaction approves its predecessor transactions depends on the weight, i.e.,
the computational work, that went into producing it. The stability of the system therefore rests on the
assumption that the majority of the computing power among the nodes behaves correctly. Furthermore, if
there are conflicting parts of the graph, each node will decide on its own which side to trust. This is done
through a probabilistic sampling algorithm and deciding according to a statistical test. The construction
of the DAG is reminiscent of Lewenberg et al.’s [46] inclusive blockchain protocols, but the details differ.
The white paper [58] and documentation claim that the tangle hash-DAG ensures a similar level
of consistency as other permissionless blockchain systems. No publicly reviewed, formal analysis is
available, however. Without any independent assessment of the protocol’s properties, it remains unclear
how strictly the tangle emulates a notion of consensus among the nodes.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has summarized some of the most prominent blockchain consensus protocols, focusing on
permissioned systems in the sense that their participants are identified.
We have argued that developing consensus protocols is similar to engineering cryptographic systems,
and that blockchain developers should look towards the established experience in cryptography, security,
and the theory of distributed systems for building trustworthy systems. Otherwise, it might be danger-
ous to entrust financial value to new protocols. Open discussion, expert reviews, broad validation, and
standards recommendations should be employed.
The overview of consensus protocols and their properties contributes to this effort, by establishing a
common ground for formal protocol reviews and more technical comparisons. Once sufficiently many
systems become available publicly and are widely used, it will be interesting to compare their perfor-
mance through benchmarks and to observe their resilience to actual attacks or network incidents.
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